What exactly was it allowed to do?
The signed contract, with its version, and the grant bound to the parameters that were evaluated under it.
Walkthrough
A supplier invoice for 13,800 USD, proposed by an agent that has been delegated authority. Each step below shows the decision, approval or evidence record your team should inspect when evaluating this workflow.
Explore this guided example using sample data. No transaction is submitted. To evaluate the workflow with your systems, request a working session.
Interactive scenario
Change the proposed amount and review how the same policy allows, escalates or refuses it. Use sample values to explore the decision; no authorization or transaction is submitted.
Not a role and not a scope. A signed contract states the limits: how much, to whom, through which tool, in which environment, for how long, and how far it may be delegated. Signing happens on an enrolled device, and a signed version is immutable - a material change is a new version and a new signature.
{
"name": "Supplier renewals",
"purpose": "Pay approved supplier invoices",
"constraints": {
"maximumAmount": 25000,
"currency": "USD",
"allowedTools": ["billing"],
"allowedActions": ["renew"],
"approvedCounterparties": ["vendor-4471"],
"allowedEnvironments": ["production"],
"delegationDepth": 1,
"cumulativeLimit": 250000
}
}A closed envelope of typed predicates. There is no free-text field at any version, which is what keeps the counterparty's name, the account number and the invoice out of the platform entirely - it evaluates a reference, not an identity. The amount crosses as a string because it is hashed as text: 13800 and 13800.00 are the same number and different strings.
{
"intentId": "<signed-contract>",
"agentId": "<agent>",
"tool": "billing",
"action": "renew",
"environment": "production",
"predicates": [
{ "type": "amount", "currency": "USD", "value": "13800.00" },
{ "type": "counterparty_reference", "value": "vendor-4471" }
]
}One evaluation path, and every finding reported rather than the first - an evaluator that stops at the first problem teaches an agent to iterate against the policy instead of reconsidering the action. No model output can turn a denial into an allow; semantic review may only escalate. Any error in this plane denies.
{
"decision": "REQUIRE_APPROVAL",
"findings": [
{ "code": "amount_exceeds_unattended_limit",
"detail": "13800.00 USD is above the 5000.00 unattended ceiling" }
],
"approvalId": "<approval>"
}The platform builds the display, not the requester. The rows come from the envelope that was evaluated and the organization comes from a registry entry that proved its domain - so nothing can put another company's name on the screen, and nothing can show a sentence that differs from what is being authorized. The device signs a statement covering both the action hash and a digest of exactly those rows.
acme.test
Biometric confirmation required
Single-use, short-lived, ES256-signed, and bound to a hash of the exact parameters that were evaluated. It does not say the agent may pay suppliers. It says this amount, to this counterparty, once, before this instant.
{
"id": "<grant>",
"agentId": "<agent>",
"intentVersion": 1,
"actionHash": "9F2C…",
"expiresAt": "+60s",
"singleUse": true,
"signature": "<ES256>",
"signingKeyId": "<kid>"
}The protected resource checks the grant itself rather than trusting that the agent honoured the decision. Redemption recomputes the parameter hash and compares in constant time, and the swap is atomic so two concurrent redemptions cannot both win.
replayThe grant was already spent.
wrong_agentIt belongs to a different agent.
expiredSixty seconds elapsed.
revokedAuthority was withdrawn after issue.
parameter_mismatchA material parameter changed.
contract_not_activeThe contract was paused or revoked.
What ran, against what was authorized. A connector that describes nothing is recorded as "not provided" rather than as a match - describing nothing has not established that nothing changed. The decision, the approval, the grant, the redemption and the receipt all append to one hash-linked chain.
{
"status": "Succeeded",
"externalReference": "bank-txn-881",
"comparison": "Matched",
"intentVersion": 1,
"decisionId": "<decision>",
"evidenceHash": "4B17…"
}Review the integration requirements and supporting evidence for this capability. Talk to us
What to inspect
The signed contract, with its version, and the grant bound to the parameters that were evaluated under it.
A device signature covering both the action hash and a digest of the rows the approver was shown.
A receipt comparing the executed action with the authorized one, on a tamper-evident record your team can export and review.
Each consequential action moves through the same six control points. See where 2AYE evaluates authority, requests human review, and preserves the outcome.