2AYE

Walkthrough

One consequential action, from signed intent to a verifiable receipt.

A supplier invoice for 13,800 USD, proposed by an agent that has been delegated authority. Each step below shows the decision, approval or evidence record your team should inspect when evaluating this workflow.

Explore this guided example using sample data. No transaction is submitted. To evaluate the workflow with your systems, request a working session.

Interactive scenario

Adjust an action.
See the boundary.

Change the proposed amount and review how the same policy allows, escalates or refuses it. Use sample values to explore the decision; no authorization or transaction is submitted.

Interactive authorization modelBrowser illustration · no action executes
REQUESTING ACTORTreasury Agent v4.2Delegated by J. Okafor, CFO
PROPOSED ACTIONTransfer $3,000,000
  1. 01
    Principal resolvedJ. Okafor, CFO
  2. 02
    Identity and session trustOwner, tenant, device, delegation
  3. 03
    Agent action policyAmount, tool, environment, risk
  4. 04
    Approval requiredIf over threshold
  5. 05
    Execution evidencePrepared after authorization
DECISIONWAITING
  1. 01

    A human signs the bounds

    Not a role and not a scope. A signed contract states the limits: how much, to whom, through which tool, in which environment, for how long, and how far it may be delegated. Signing happens on an enrolled device, and a signed version is immutable - a material change is a new version and a new signature.

    POST /v1/intents → POST /v1/intents/{id}/sign
    {
      "name": "Supplier renewals",
      "purpose": "Pay approved supplier invoices",
      "constraints": {
        "maximumAmount": 25000,
        "currency": "USD",
        "allowedTools": ["billing"],
        "allowedActions": ["renew"],
        "approvedCounterparties": ["vendor-4471"],
        "allowedEnvironments": ["production"],
        "delegationDepth": 1,
        "cumulativeLimit": 250000
      }
    }
  2. 02

    The agent proposes an exact action

    A closed envelope of typed predicates. There is no free-text field at any version, which is what keeps the counterparty's name, the account number and the invoice out of the platform entirely - it evaluates a reference, not an identity. The amount crosses as a string because it is hashed as text: 13800 and 13800.00 are the same number and different strings.

    POST /v1/runtime/evaluations
    {
      "intentId": "<signed-contract>",
      "agentId": "<agent>",
      "tool": "billing",
      "action": "renew",
      "environment": "production",
      "predicates": [
        { "type": "amount", "currency": "USD", "value": "13800.00" },
        { "type": "counterparty_reference", "value": "vendor-4471" }
      ]
    }
  3. 03

    One deterministic decision

    One evaluation path, and every finding reported rather than the first - an evaluator that stops at the first problem teaches an agent to iterate against the policy instead of reconsidering the action. No model output can turn a denial into an allow; semantic review may only escalate. Any error in this plane denies.

    Decision
    {
      "decision": "REQUIRE_APPROVAL",
      "findings": [
        { "code": "amount_exceeds_unattended_limit",
          "detail": "13800.00 USD is above the 5000.00 unattended ceiling" }
      ],
      "approvalId": "<approval>"
    }
  4. 04

    A person approves what they can see

    The platform builds the display, not the requester. The rows come from the envelope that was evaluated and the organization comes from a registry entry that proved its domain - so nothing can put another company's name on the screen, and nothing can show a sentence that differs from what is being authorized. The device signs a statement covering both the action hash and a digest of exactly those rows.

    Shown on the enrolled device
    Acme BankVerified

    acme.test

    Action
    Renew
    Requested by
    Procurement Agent
    Amount
    13800.00 USD
    Counterparty
    vendor-4471
    Environment
    Production
    Expires
    2026-09-24 10:46:00 UTC
    DenyApprove 13,800.00

    Biometric confirmation required

  5. 05

    A grant bound to those parameters

    Single-use, short-lived, ES256-signed, and bound to a hash of the exact parameters that were evaluated. It does not say the agent may pay suppliers. It says this amount, to this counterparty, once, before this instant.

    Authorization grant
    {
      "id": "<grant>",
      "agentId": "<agent>",
      "intentVersion": 1,
      "actionHash": "9F2C…",
      "expiresAt": "+60s",
      "singleUse": true,
      "signature": "<ES256>",
      "signingKeyId": "<kid>"
    }
  6. 06

    The resource verifies, then executes

    The protected resource checks the grant itself rather than trusting that the agent honoured the decision. Redemption recomputes the parameter hash and compares in constant time, and the swap is atomic so two concurrent redemptions cannot both win.

    Refusals the runtime actually returns
    • replay

      The grant was already spent.

    • wrong_agent

      It belongs to a different agent.

    • expired

      Sixty seconds elapsed.

    • revoked

      Authority was withdrawn after issue.

    • parameter_mismatch

      A material parameter changed.

    • contract_not_active

      The contract was paused or revoked.

  7. 07

    A receipt, compared and chained

    What ran, against what was authorized. A connector that describes nothing is recorded as "not provided" rather than as a match - describing nothing has not established that nothing changed. The decision, the approval, the grant, the redemption and the receipt all append to one hash-linked chain.

    Execution receipt
    {
      "status": "Succeeded",
      "externalReference": "bank-txn-881",
      "comparison": "Matched",
      "intentVersion": 1,
      "decisionId": "<decision>",
      "evidenceHash": "4B17…"
    }

Review the integration requirements and supporting evidence for this capability. Talk to us

What to inspect

Three questions that usually have no answer.

What exactly was it allowed to do?

The signed contract, with its version, and the grant bound to the parameters that were evaluated under it.

Who decided, and did they see it?

A device signature covering both the action hash and a digest of the rows the approver was shown.

Did what happened match?

A receipt comparing the executed action with the authorized one, on a tamper-evident record your team can export and review.

The enforcement path

Follow this walkthrough from identity to evidence.

Each consequential action moves through the same six control points. See where 2AYE evaluates authority, requests human review, and preserves the outcome.

  1. 01IdentityWho or what is acting
  2. 02IntentSigned purpose and limits
  3. 03PolicyDeterministic evaluation
  4. 04ApprovalA named human when required
  5. 05ExecutionSingle-use grant, redeemed at the resource
  6. 06EvidenceReceipt joined to the audit chain
Deterministic decisionsSingle-use, exact-action grantsHash-linked evidence